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Intertemporal Discounting and Policy Selection
Juan Carlos Conesa and Carlos Garriga
S everal methods can be used to evaluate the impact of alternative fiscal policies. One ofthe most widely used methods, generally referred to as “generational accounting,” con-sists of computing the net present value of taxes, net of transfers, for each age cohort. A
key ingredient of this method is the choice of the intertemporal discount rate. As is well known,
this choice affects the magnitude of the measured impact of a given policy. In this article, we
use examples and a quantitative simulation to show that the choice of the discount rate can, in
fact, reverse the ranking of alternative policies.
We proceed as follows to illustrate our point. Suppose a government considers policy B as
an alternative to the existing policy A. Following our previous work (Conesa and Garriga, 2008a),
it is easy to construct examples where policy B has no real effects on the economy (i.e., the levels
of output, employment, consumption, and welfare remain the same as with policy A). However,
the methodology would rank policy A above policy B (or vice versa) for different discount rates.
The resulting implications are important for policy evaluation and suggest great caution in
the quantitative evaluation of policies that might be implemented in the near future. The recent
financial crises in the United States will leave a huge hole in taxpayers’ pockets. The economic
slowdown has triggered an unprecedented accommodative response from the U.S. Department
of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve that must be paid for in the future. In addition, future
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demographic changes will have an important impact not only on labor markets and the tax bill
for social insurance programs such as Social Security and Medicare, but also on tax revenue col-
lection. The magnitude of these fiscal adjustments ultimately needs to be determined based on
intergenerational equity (current versus future taxpayers) and incentives (mitigating the distor-
tions from taxation).
The advantage of generational accounting methodology is the relative ease in computing
the tax burden since no specific assumptions about individual preferences, technology, and
market structure are required.1 It is sufficient to determine an intertemporal discount rate so
the tax burden paid by future generations can be directly compared with that of the current
generation. This methodology has no equilibrium concept, takes all prices as exogenously given,
and does not take the general equilibrium effect into consideration. The ease of computation
explains its widespread use for policy analysis in practice (e.g., by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, U.S. Department of the Treasury, the World Bank) to assess the burden
of future demographics or the impact of policy reforms.
Generational accounting methodology was developed by Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff
(1991).2 It constructs individual specific metrics of tax incidence with the objective of identifying
the individuals who currently bear the cost of taxation. The methodology uses the intertemporal
budget constraint to compare any discrepancy in the level of taxes paid and transfers received by
a particular cohort or subset of individuals. If the economy grows at a given rate (i.e., balanced
growth), taxation and expenditure should be expected to grow at the same rate. If taxes grow at
a lower rate, then some future generations will face higher taxes. In this literature, it is common
practice to calculate the net tax burden that future generations must bear to achieve long-term
balance in the government budget constraint. Any structural change to balance these intergen-
erational accounts must be captured by a change in the fiscal incidence and transfers received
by each generation. As such, tax policies are compared and selected based on their ability to bal-
ance these intergenerational disparities.
One limitation of the generational accounting framework is that it ignores the impact of
taxation on economic activity. To address this criticism, Fehr and Kotlikoff (1996) measured the
fiscal incidence implied by the generational accounts method in a dynamic general equilibrium
life cycle model. They found that generational accounts match the evolution of welfare changes
for each cohort, but they err with regard to the magnitude of the utility changes. They argue that
the deviation between welfare changes and generational accounts is quantitatively small when
there is little change in the capital-to-output ratio that determines the equilibrium interest rate
and wage rates.
We argue that the methodology suffers from problems more severe than the bias in the
quantitative magnitudes. We use some simple examples as well as a quantitative model. In each
case, we compare the generational accounts implied by the baseline policy with those associated
with neutral tax reforms (see Conesa and Garriga, 2008a). The numerical simulations suggest
that for small deviations of the discount rate, the magnitude, and even the sign, of the bias can
be significant. This problem is more general and also appears in reforms with real economic
effects (see Conesa and Garriga, 2013), but it is simpler to illustrate it when this is not the case.
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GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTING
We closely follow Kotlikoff ’s (2002) description of generational accounting methodology.
The tax burden gat,k in period t of a cohort born in period k is measured as
(1)
where TAXs,k is taxes net of transfers paid at time s by the cohort born in period k, R is the dis-
count factor, ps,k/pt,k is the fraction of individuals surviving at time s, and d is the life expectancy
of a cohort.
Therefore, equation (1) represents the present value of the average amount of taxes paid by
the survivors of cohort members born at time k. The TAX term includes total taxes paid minus
transfer payments of different forms. If we are calculating the generational account implied by
a model, all these elements are clearly specified. However, if data are used as the input, the
process is a bit more involved because it includes expenditures on health care, education, and
other forms of transfer programs. Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Gokhale (2002) provide a detailed
description of how to map the data into the generational accounts. However, they do not impute
to any specific cohort the value of government expenditures on goods and services. The main
reason for this limitation is the difficulty in assigning the benefit of government purchases to
different generations.
The government intertemporal budget constraint can then be reinterpreted in terms of gen-
erational accounts as follows:
(2)
where mt,k denotes the population weight of individuals in period t of cohorts born at time k.
The metric calculates the taxes expected to be paid by each cohort, and the population weight
adjusts for the size of a given cohort.
The term gat,t–s on the left-hand side of equation (2) captures the generational accounts of
existing cohorts, whereas the second term adds the generational accounts of unborn cohorts
discounted at rate R. The term on the right-hand side represents the amount of outstanding
government debt Bt (financial liabilities minus the sum of the government’s financial assets and
the market value of public enterprises) and the value of present and future government expen-
ditures. The term Gt+s represents the level of government expenditures in period t+s.
The Intertemporal Discount Rate
The choice of the intertemporal discount rate Rmerits special attention because it influences
the generational accounts for present and future generations. The choice becomes even more
problematic in the presence of varying rates or uncertainty because then the use of the term
structure or risk correction is required. Moreover, in the presence of incomplete markets, risk
adjustment may be cohort specific. 
max
∑ π
π
=
{ }
( )
− −
=
+
ga R TAX ,t ,k
t s s ,k
t ,ks t ,k
k d
s ,k
∑ ∑ ∑µ µ+ = + =
− −
=
+ + + +
=
∞
+
=
∞
1 2
0 1 1
ga
ga
R
B G
R
, t , , ,t ,t s t ,t s
s
d
t s ,t s t s ,t s
s
s
t
t s
s
s
…
Conesa and Garriga
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis REVIEW March/April  2013 167
In standard practice, a benchmark constant discount rate is used to represent the results
under alternative constant discount rates. Assuming a constant discount rate can be restrictive
because the capital-to-output ratio that ultimately determines interest rates may vary in the
presence of demographic shocks or as the result of different policy regimes. We argue that, in
general, the choice of the intertemporal discount rate also introduces a bias when evaluating
equivalent tax reforms.
Generational Account Imbalances and Policy Selection
Given the tax burden in the present generation {gat,t–s}ds=0 and the sequence of future expen-
ditures {Gt+s} s=1, it is possible to calculate the tax payments of future generations as a residual.
If the tax burden of future generations differs very little from that of the current ones, gat,t+s ª
gat,t–s, there are no imbalances in the lifetime taxes/transfers paid. When there are imbalances,
gat,t+s ≠ gat,t–s, it is possible to compute the adjustments to tax policy that can restore the balance.
Income growth is accounted for by the common assumption that productivity and wages grow
at a constant rate g > 0. Then, it is possible to calculate the growth-adjusted generational account
of future generations, denoted by ga—. Formally,
(3)
For example, we could solve for the percentage change in government expenditures Dg that
achieves generational balance. Formally,
(4)
Another important element is the impact of demographic changes on the imbalance of gen-
erational accounts. Consequently, population growth of future generations can reduce imbal-
ances in the generational policy, whereas population aging can exacerbate a larger tax burden
on currently young and future cohorts.
An extensive literature uses generational accounts to measure fiscal imbalances associated
with different tax reforms. For example, Gokhale et al. (2000) analyze the use of the long-term
projections of the Congressional Budget Office for the United States. The authors use a 4 percent
discount rate and a 2.2 percent rate of productivity growth to compute the generational imbal-
ances; they estimate that future generations will face a lifetime tax burden 41.6 percent higher
than that of existing generations. They consider five alternative policies to balance the genera-
tional accounts. The first is a 31 percent permanent increase in federal, personal, and corporate
income taxes. The second is a 12 percent increase in all federal, state, and local taxes. The third
policy requires cutting all transfers programs (Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps,
unemployment insurance benefits, housing support, and so on) by 21.9 percent. The final two
policy options require the reduction of either all government expenditures by 21 percent or fed-
eral expenditures by 66.3 percent. The methodology has been used to evaluate other policy
reforms that include a switch from income to consumption taxation (as in Altig et al., 2001) or
Social Security privatization (as in Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser, 2002). The methodology
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has also been applied to other countries such as the United Kingdom (as in Cardarelli, Sefton,
and Kotlikoff, 2000). For an international study, see Kotlikoff and Raffelhüschen (1999).
MEASUREMENT OF TAX INCIDENCE AND BIAS
This section begins with two examples in a simple framework. In each example, the economy
starts with a given tax policy A and considers an alternative policy B. We follow some of the
examples in the literature and consider the case of a redistributive policy and the substitution of
tax instruments (consumption taxes versus income taxes). In each case, we choose alternative
fiscal policies that have no real effects on the economy but give rise to different measures of tax
incidence for various intertemporal discount rates.
The Simple Model
Our simple model considers a two-period environment in which households solve a simple
intertemporal consumption problem:
(5)
where c1 and c2 denote consumption, w1 and w2 are the endowments, and a2 is the asset level.
The terms T1 and T2 represent a lump-sum tax (negative value) or a transfer (positive value),
respectively. Because the purpose of the example is to measure the tax burden, we consider spe-
cific values for the parameters. In particular, the discount factor is b = 0.5, the interest rate is 
r = 2, and individuals have an income endowment of w1 = w2 = 100 units of the consumption
good. The tax policy A is entirely characterized by a capital income tax of tk = 0.5 and no inter-
generational transfers, T1 = T2 = 0.
Given the parameter values, it is simple to check that the optimal solution implies that 
c1 = c2 = 100 and a2 = 0. Therefore, taxes paid are 0, and the present value of net taxes paid is
also gaA = 0.
Example 1: Reallocation of Resources over the Life Cycle. A typical example in the litera-
ture involves changes in the distribution of resources over time such as social security privatiza-
tion (see, e.g., Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser, 2002). Consider a policy B where households
receive a transfer in period 1 of T1 = 50 and face a tax in period 2 of T2 = 100 units. The capital
income tax is kept at 50 percent.
The reallocation of resources over the life cycle does not alter the households’ intertemporal
budget constraint, as shown below:
(6)
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Now, the optimal consumption allocation remains the same (c1 = c2 = 100), but the optimal
level of savings is a2 = 50. The present value of taxes net of transfers is expressed as 
(8)
The value depends on the intertemporal discount rate R. When R = 2, the implied genera-
tional accounts show that households are paying more taxes (gaB = 25) with policy B than with
policy A. For a larger discount rate (R = 4), the results are the opposite and the households are
perceived to receive net transfers (gaB = –20). There exists an interest rate that clearly equalizes
the measure for both policies, R = 1 + r = 3, but otherwise the measure shows a clear bias. 
The direction of redistribution is irrelevant. Consider an alternative policy C that redistrib-
utes in the opposite direction, from young to old (i.e., Social Security). The policy implements a
tax T1 = 50 in period 1 and a transfer T2 = 100 in period 2. Since the intertemporal budget con-
straint does not change, the optimal consumption allocation is the same, c1 = c2 = 100, but now
consumers borrow a2 = –50. Now the implied generational accounts measuring the present
value of taxes net of transfers become
(9)
Now, we obtain the opposite effect. When R = 2, the implied generational accounts are lower,
gaC = –25, with policy C than with policy A. With R = 4 the opposite is true: gaC = –20.
One of the challenges for the policymaker is the correct choice of the intertemporal discount
rate. In this particular example, R = 1 + r = 3 is the correct choice but, in general, there is no nat-
ural candidate for the discount rate. The example shows that a small deviation affects not only
the magnitude but also the sign.
This example illustrates tax reforms that redistribute resources across time. In previous
work (Conesa and Garriga, 2008a), we have shown that this neutrality holds even in the presence
of labor supply distortions.
Example 2: Substitution of Consumption Taxes for Capital Taxes. Another typical example
in this literature is the substitution of tax instruments (see Altig et al., 2001). We now consider
an alternative policy D. This new policy transfers resources to period 1 through a transfer T1 = 10,
the capital income tax is lowered to tk = 0.25, and the loss of revenue is compensated with a
consumption tax in period 2 of tc,2 = 0.25.
As in the previous examples, policy D does not alter households’ intertemporal budget 
constraint:
(10)
The optimal consumption allocation remains the same (c1 = c2 = 100), but the implied level
of savings is now a2 = w1 + T1 – c1 = 10. The generational accounts associated with the new policy
are represented by
(11)
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Depending on the choice of the intertemporal discount rate, the associated generational accounts
will have different signs, gaD(2) = 5 and gaD(4) = –2.5. Only for the natural rate are the genera-
tional accounts the same across equivalent policies.
Notably, all of these examples share two common features: Alternative fiscal policies redis-
tribute taxes/transfers over the life cycle, and households respond optimally by changing their
level of savings. Because the return on savings is taxed, redistribution of the tax burden over the
life cycle changes the present value of taxes paid. Only when the government and the private
sector discount the future at the same rate are the generational accounts equivalent. While this
has an easy fix in this simple economy, the government should always use the natural rate or
market rate, R = 1 + r; in more complex economies with heterogeneous agents, there is no con-
nection between the two terms. As a result, the generational accounts will be biased when used
to evaluate equivalent policies. This result has two important implications. From the positive
point of view, the measurement of tax incidence implied by generational accounts does not pro-
vide an accurate description (i.e., an invariant metric) of generational imbalances. From the
normative point of view, the evaluation of tax policies based on the distribution of the tax burden
for different age cohorts could be misleading with regard to the effective cost for each cohort. 
Next, we quantify the potential size of the bias for small deviations in the intertemporal 
discount rate. For this analysis, we use a fairly standard overlapping-generations model with
production. 
QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE TAX INCIDENCE BIAS
In this section, we measure the potential size of the tax incidence bias using a generalized
version of the examples in the previous section.
A Standard Life Cycle Model
Generations live for I periods. Preferences of an individual born in period t are represented
by a time-separable utility function of the following form:
(12)
where cj,t and lj,t denote consumption and hours worked, respectively, of individuals of age j at
time t. An individual’s subjective discount factor is denoted by b. The utility function is assumed
to be twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave, monotonically increasing in consump-
tion and leisure, and satisfies the standard Inada conditions. At each point in time, households
are endowed with one divisible unit of time that can be used for work and leisure. One unit of
time of a household of age i transforms into ei units of labor input. The time-invariant endow-
ment profile of efficiency units of labor over the life cycle is denoted by e = {e1,…,el}. The popu-
lation grows at rate n.
Individuals supply their labor services and assets in competitive markets. Then, they receive
a competitive wage, wt , per efficiency unit of labor supplied in period t. They also hold assets,
ai,t , in the form of physical capital or government bonds, in exchange for a market rental rate, rt.
Clearly, the return of both investments must be the same if households are to hold both types of
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assets. We denote the transfer payments received by cohort j as mj,t. Notice that this allows
transfers to change over the life cycle.3
The production-possibility frontier is represented by a constant returns to scale technology,
Yt = F(Kt,Lt), that transforms units of capital, Kt, and efficiency units of labor, 
into value added. The term mi,t represents the relative size of each cohort. The production func-
tion is assumed to satisfy the standard Inada conditions. There is no technological progress, and
capital depreciates at a constant rate d. We consider a single representative firm that operates
the aggregate technology, taking factor prices wt,rt as given.
Each period production can be used for private consumption, investment, and nonproduc-
tive government expenditure.4 We take the sequence of government consumption to be exoge-
nously specified. The period resource constraint is then expressed as
(13)
where the term represents aggregate consumption. The government at each 
period collects consumption taxes, labor income taxes, capital income taxes, and one-period
bonds to finance government expenditure and transfer programs, Thus, the 
period government budget constraint is given by 
(14)
Definition 1. Given a government policy, a market equilibrium in the economy is a sequence
of allocations and prices such that (i) consumers maximize utility subject to their budget con-
straints, (ii) firms maximize profits, (iii) the government budget constraint is balanced, and (iv)
markets clear.
In general, it is difficult to characterize the equilibrium path and the optimal decision rules
for a given tax policy. In the absence of a closed-form solution, we use numerical methods to
simulate the policy reforms and quantify the size of the bias.
The illustration follows Example 1 and performs a neutral Social Security privatization that
transforms the unfunded system into a funded one with private accounts following our previous
work (Conesa and Garriga, 2008a). In general, an unfunded social insurance system is an inter-
generational redistribution scheme, or equivalently, an implicit debt scheme. The young provide
resources through contributions that are used to finance the benefits of the retired. Contributions
made by the young generate an entitlement to a future benefit upon retirement, which constitutes
an implicit debt of the social security system toward them. Upon retirement, these new retirees
sell their claims to Social Security benefits to the new cohorts of workers. Consequently, such
Social Security privatization only amounts to making explicit the implicit debt. There is no wel-
fare gain associated with this recognition.
However, the choice of the intertemporal discount rate can yield different values for the
measures of tax incidence computed for policy A (the unfunded system) and policy B (the funded
system). One measure of the size of the bias is the difference between these metrics.
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Parameterization
Next we determine the choice of functional forms and parameters for the model simulation.
Functional Forms. We pose a standard log utility function between consumption and
leisure:
(15)
where g represents the consumption share on the utility function.
The aggregate technology is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale: 
(16)
where a = 1/3 represents the capital income share in output. 
Population Structure and Income. A model period is equivalent to one year. Given our
period choice, we assume households (i) live for 65 periods so that the economically active life
of a household starts at age 20 and (ii) die with certainty at age 85. In the benchmark economy,
households retire in period 45 (equivalent to 65 years of age). Finally, we normalize the mass of
households to be 1. We assume that households are endowed with one unit of time. The lifetime
profile of efficiency units is constructed using Current Population Survey data.
Government Policy. The level of government expenditure is exogenously specified as 20
percent of output. Revenue is derived from two sources: (i) capital and labor income taxes and
(ii) consumption taxes. In addition, the government administers a pay-as-you-go social security
system in the benchmark policy scenario. We assume that the tax on capital income is 33 percent,
social security contributions are 10.5 percent of labor income, and consumption taxes are 5 per-
cent. The labor income tax is chosen to balance the government budget given the target level of
outstanding government debt.
γ γ( )( ) ( )= + − −ln 1 ln 1u c,l c l ,
1( ) = α α−F K ,L K L ,
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Table 1
Parameterization of the Economy
Statistic Target Result
Wealth-to-GDP ratio 3.00 3.00
Investment-to-GDP ratio 0.16 0.16
Average hours worked 0.33 0.33
Debt-to-GDP ratio 0.50 0.50
Government expenditure-to-GDP ratio 0.20 0.20
Variable Parameter Value
Discount factor b 0.984
Consumption share g 0.460
Depreciation rate d 0.041
Labor income tax t l 0.169
Given the assumptions on the functional forms, endowments, and tax rates, we jointly solve
for the equilibrium and the parameterization to match target statistics. Table 1 defines the
parameter values and the targets.
We want our economy to match three empirical targets. First, we define aggregate capital as
the level of fixed assets in the Bureau of Economic Analysis statistics, giving an implied capital-
to-output ratio of 3.00. The second target is an investment-to-output ratio of 16 percent. The
third target is the average number of hours worked over the life cycle, with an average of one-
third (0.33) of the time of households allocated to market activities. In addition, we fix govern-
ment debt (defined as federal, state, and local) with an implied government debt-to-gross
domestic product (GDP) ratio of 0.50 and a government expenditure-to-GDP ratio of 0.20.
Our three targets determine the value of three parameters: the discount factor, the con-
sumption share in the utility function, and the depreciation rate. In addition, the labor income
tax is endogenously determined from the government’s budget constraint given the ratios of
government debt and expenditure to GDP.
Equivalent Tax Reforms: The Case of a Neutral Social Security Reform
The fiscal reform we examine follows our previous work (Conesa and Garriga, 2008a) and
illustrates the measurement discrepancies generated by the standard generational accounting
procedure. The goal is to privatize the social security system while maintaining the level of dis-
Conesa and Garriga
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tortions from the baseline economy.5 The timing of events is as follows. We assume that at time 1
the economy is in steady state with an unfunded social security system. The contributions made
by working cohorts generate an entitlement to a future benefit upon retirement, which consti-
tutes an implicit debt of the social security system toward them. Upon retirement, these retirees
receive their claims.
The reform is implemented at time 2. The government eliminates pensions and gives com-
pensatory transfers to all households. These household-specific transfers are financed with gov-
ernment debt. The anticipation of the reform is a nonissue in this exercise. The reform does not
alter households’ intertemporal budget constraint. The privatization effectively transforms the
implicit debt of the social security system into explicit debt, but real allocations and welfare
remain unchanged. The resulting distribution of wealth is different, since now the implicit social
security claims are transformed into explicit assets in the hands of households. Figure 1 compares
distributions of wealth under both policies.
The asset distribution under the funded system (policy B) is always above the unfunded
one (policy A) because workers use the proceeds from social security contributions to invest in
private savings accounts. The youngest cohort receives a transfer of an initial level of assets equiv-
alent to the net present value of social security transfers. This amount ensures that the consumer
intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied. The difference between the newly issued govern-
ment bonds and the initial outstanding government debt determines the implicit debt of the
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social security system. Figure 2 shows the net taxes paid over the life cycle in these two equiva-
lent policy regimes.
Under the unfunded social security system, the entire tax burden is on individuals 65 years
of age and younger. Retired households pay consumption and capital income taxes, but in net
terms they receive resources (their pensions). Under the new regime, retired households do not
receive a transfer from the government, and they are fully taxed for the interest earned in their
retirement accounts. Despite the differences in the amount of taxes paid, the welfare distribution
is the same across tax regimes. Using the net taxes paid and the relative size of each cohort, we
can compute the generational accounts of each cohort based on the cohort’s age. 
Figure 3 summarizes the model-implied generational accounts for these two equivalent
social security regimes for different intertemporal discount rates. Notice that the standard gen-
erational accounting procedure is not invariant between these two equivalent policy regimes
because the two top curves in the figure do not lie on top of each other. Furthermore, the order
can be reversed depending on the discount rate. With a high intertemporal discount rate, R = 7
percent, policy B seems to reduce the tax burden of the current cohorts; but, with a lower dis-
count rate, the opposite is true. 
The bias is driven purely by the fact that government bond holdings are larger in the funded
regime when they are not net wealth. Because capital income (derived from holding government
debt or financial assets) is taxed, the imputed tax burden varies across the two policy regimes.
However, the proceeds from selling the government bonds are, by construction, equal to the
transfers received from the social security system. The difference is that transfers under the
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Generational Accounts for Different Intertemporal Rates R
NOTE: Ga, generational accounting measure of tax burden.
equivalent policy are computed as a taxable asset and an explicit government liability that lasts
forever. In contrast, net transfers from the government are funded by workers’ contributions
and become an implicit government liability. The latter situation creates a bias as long as the
intertemporal discount rate does not equate both lines. In the simulations, the magnitude of the
bias can easily range between 18 and 22 percent. In this type of policy comparisons with no real
effects, an intertemporal discount rate exists that guarantees this is the case (Figure 4), but any
deviation from this rate generates a bias.
In this article, we have assumed that markets are complete. That is, households are allowed
to trade assets to smooth consumption over the life cycle. The choice of the intertemporal dis-
count rate is more challenging in more complex economies with heterogeneous agents or in
economies in transition dynamics where the interest rates vary over time. However, the findings
in this article do not depend on these model features.
CONCLUSION
As the number of retirees in the United States doubles over the next 25 years, the number of
employees in the workforce will grow by only 20 percent. This demographic transition surely
will have an important effect on the federal budget unless Social Security and Medicare benefits
Conesa and Garriga
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are reduced. The determination of which cohorts will bear the cost is important, but agreement
on how to measure generational imbalances is needed first.
We show that the choice of the intertemporal discount rate is very problematic in assessing
the fiscal burden of different age cohorts; it affects not only the magnitude but also the sign of
policy rankings based on this metric. In the simulations, the size of the bias easily ranges
between 18 and 22 percent.
NOTES
1 Welfare analysis is an alternative method to measure tax incidence. This approach requires specific assumptions
about preferences and technology and is based entirely on individual optimizing behavior and market-clearing con-
ditions. Conesa and Garriga (2008b) use optimal fiscal policy to design the best possible response to demographic
shocks.
2 A similar approach has been used by the economists at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. They
have developed a stylized model to measure the impact of population aging on living standards using consumption
growth. For example, Bernanke (2006) summarizes the findings of Elmendorf and Sheiner (2000) and Sheiner, Sichel,
and Slifman (2006) and proposes alternatives to deal with the demographic transition.
3 We do not restrict the sign of government transfer programs for workers and retirees. This is irrelevant because the
focus of our article is the measurement of the tax incidence over different cohorts, not the distortionary effect of dif-
ferent tax instruments on these individuals.
4 We choose to have a nonproductive government expenditure with a benchmark comparable to the generational
accounting methodology.
5 Clearly, it is possible to achieve better policy results by optimizing distortions, as in our previous work (Conesa and
Garriga, 2008a), where we use optimal fiscal policy to do precisely that.
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